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THE NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE STATUTE
ROBERT

G.

BYRDt

North Carolina'sMedical MalpracticeAct sought to codify the
customarypracticestandardof care andthe same or similar community
rule in malpracticeactions. Itfurtherprovidesfor a customarypractice
standardand an objective standardof causation in informed consent
cases. The provisions governing the requirementfor expert testimony,
the qualfcations of expert witnesses, and the scope of the customary
practice standard are susceptible to several interpretations, and the
caselaw refects the statute's ambiguity. ProfessorByrd examines some
of the statute's ambiuousprovisions and argues that the statute must
be interpretedin light of the common lawpreviouslygoverning malpractice actions. He cautions that interpretationof the statute without regardto the common law and without sufficient sensitivity to thepolicies
underlying the statute andmalpracticelaw may yield resultscontraryto
the legislativepurpose.
The North Carolina Medical Malpractice Actions law,' adopted in the
aftermath of the malpractice liability insurance crisis of the mid 1970s, 2 establishes the standard of care for determining liability in both orthodox malpractice actions and informed consent cases. The law applies to all malpractice
cases based upon incidents occurring before or after July 1, 1976, its effective
date,3 except those cases in which litigation was pending on that date.
The statute incorporates many aspects of traditional malpractice law, introduces some new concepts, and contains provisions that may be interpreted
to fall into either of these categories. Because of this mixture of the old, the
new, and the uncertain, the overall impact of the statute is unclear. It may be
interpreted as doing little more than codifying existing law, or it may be construed as effecting sweeping changes. Although the statute has been in effect
for seven years, no case presenting the major questions arising under it has
been decided. The absence of such a decision is not in itself reason for concern, but the possibility that these questions could be resolved in a less deliberate way is not entirely remote. A major interpretation could unwittingly
evolve from the cumulative effect of isolated cases, none of which seems to be
t Burton Craige Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. B.S. 1953,
J.D. 1956, North Carolina (Chapel Hill). The author wishes to express his appreciation to David
Mayberry and Cathy Rudisill for their valuable research assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-21.11 to -21.14 (1981).
2. See NORTH CAROLINA PROFESSIONAL LIABILTY INSURANCE STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1976, at 6-15 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LIABILITY INSURANCE
STUDY].
3. Simons v. Georgiade, 55 N.C. App. 483, 286 S.E.2d 596, cert. denied, 305 N.C. 587, 292
S.E.2d 571 (1982).
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of particular significance individually.4 An important interpretation included
in a pattern jury instruction could gain general acceptance from continued
5
use.
The enactment and earlier judicial adoption of the same or similar communities rule, as well as other aspects of the customary practice standard, raise
important questions concerning the qualification of experts who will be permitted to testify about customary practices. In the past, the judiciary has virtually ignored this issue. It is now being presented
with increasing frequency
6
and a body of law on the subject is evolving.
The need exists for a careful examination of the statute in the context of
the fundamental principles underlying the recognition and application of the
customary practice standard. Unless a different result clearly is mandated by
the statute, any resolution of questions implicating major changes in, or practical application of, the customary practice standard should be consistent with
these basic principles.
I. THE CUSTOMARY PRACTicE STANDARD
The objective standard in negligence law holds every person to a minimum level of knowledge and discretion. An individual cannot escape liability
by showing his capabilities were less than the minimum level. 7 This principle
applies to professionals as well as to others.8 In the ordinary case the jury
needs no special guidance to apply the objective standard. On the other hand,
the minimum level of knowledge and discretion to which the professional is to
be held is not within the jury's competence and, for that reason, the need to
inform the jury on these matters arises.
The professional standard of care is in effect a statement of the reasonable
4. See infra text accompanying notes 94-99, 144-56.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 86-87.
6. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970).
7. Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 158, 252 S.E.2d 526, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 453,
256 S.E.2d 806 (1979).
8. In Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530, 534, 187 S.E. 788, 790 (1936), the court held:
One who undertakes to treat the sick, and holds himself out as competent to administer a
certain kind or character of treatment, undertakes to bring to his employment... a fair,
reasonable, and competent degree of skill and reasonable care and diligence in the use of
his skill... and is answerable in damages for injuries proximately resulting from want
of that degree or [sic] knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by those of his system or
method of practice ....
In an earlier case, Nash v. Royster, 189 N.C. 408, 127 S.E. 356 (1925), the supreme court found
that
"The law holds [the physician] liable for an injury to his patient resulting from want of
the requisite knowledge and skill ....
The rule in relation to learning and skill does
not require the surgeon to possess that extraordinary learning and skill which belongs
only to a few men of rare endowments, but such as is possessed by the average member
of the medical profession in good standing. Still he is bound to keep abreast of the times,
and a departure from approved methods in general use ... will render him liable, however good his intentions may have been ..
"
Id. at 415, 127 S.E. at 360 (quoting Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209-10, 49 N.E. 760, 762
(1898)).
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care standard specifically tailored to the professional. The statement of the
standard in Hunt v. Bradshaw9 is typical:
A physician or surgeon who undertakes to render professional services must meet these requirements: (1) He must possess the degree of
professional learning, skill and ability which others similarly situated
ordinarily possess; (2) he must exercise reasonable care and diligence
in the application of his knowledge and skill to the patient's case; and
(3) he must use his best judgment in the treatment and care of his
patient.10
This articulation of the standard recognizes the superior knowledge, skill, and
training of the professional and also recognizes that they are to be taken into
account in determining if he has acted reasonably. Its application is not limited to the professional but is appropriate in any case in which an individual
holds himself out as belonging to a group whose members possess special
knowledge or ability.1 1
Although identification of a minimum standard related to the special
qualifications possessed by physicians is helpful, the jury still may lack the
expertise to apply it. Expert testimony usually will be necessary to enable the
jury to know the level of knowledge, skill, and training the professional should
possess and to evaluate the reasonableness of his application of them in a
given case.
The customary practice standard not only incorporates the minimum
standard of care but also provides a mechanism for admission of expert opinion testimony to provide the jury a basis for determining negligence. In many
cases the expert's opinion that conduct deviated from customary practice is the
only practical way of getting before the jury the minimum level of qualifications and discretion required. From this perspective, the customary practice
standard is simply an application of reasonable care to the higher qualifications possessed by the health care provider. Refinements in the concept of
customary practice,1 2 at least as long as they are reasonably related to defining
the appropriate minimum standard, do not conflict with this view. For example, adoption of the same or similar community rule 13 presumably reflects the
belief, based in large part on the well-worn distinction between the country
doctor and the big city doctor, that the quality of medical practice differs with
the character of communities and that the standard of care, to be fair, must
reflect this difference.
North Carolina courts have adopted this concept of customary practice.
In an early case, the court said: "It is really the application of the ordinary
principles in the law of negligence to a case requiring professional knowledge
9.
10.
11.
Wings,
12.
13.

242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
Id. at 521, 88 S.E.2d at 765.
Plyler v. Moss & Moore, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 720, 254 S.E.2d 534 (1979); Heath v. Swift
Inc., 40 N.C. App. 158, 252 S.E.2d 526, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 453, 256 S.E.2d 806 (1979).
For fuller discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 14-52.
For fuller discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 68-76.
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and skill in the performance of the duty which one person owes to another." 14
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that customary practice, as
a standard of care, encompasses a consideration of the state of medical knowledge rather than simply doctors' normal practices. In Groce v. Myers1 5 the
court observed:
One of the incidental obligations of science imposed on professional men is that they shall be judged by the standards of the science
they profess, and not wholly by empirical standards, vague and inexpression, behind which may
definite, and incapable of scientific
16
lurk charlatanry and quackery.
Accordingly, the court has rejected any absolute requirement of expert testiwhen the evidence reasonably permony and has upheld malpractice actions
17
mitted the jury to infer negligence.
Results in North Carolina cases are consistent with these principles. A
jury, without the aid of an expert, usually will have no basis for deciding
whether a diagnosis was reasonable,' 8 the decision to operate was warranted,' 9 the drug prescribed for an ailment was suitable,20 or the technical
2
procedures followed in an operation were consistent with accepted practice; '
22
in all these cases, expert testimony will be required. Except'in unusual cases,
the jury cannot infer negligence from proof of injury or other adverse consequences of treatment or medication because such results can occur when reasonable care is present. 23 In other situations, however, the judgment of the
reasonableness of the doctor's actions is clearly within the jury's competence
and expert evidence is not needed. Such is the case when a surgeon sews up in
14. Mullinax v. Hord, 174 N.C. 607, 612, 94 S.E. 426, 429 (1917).
15. 224 N.C. 165, 29 S.E.2d 553 (1944).
16. Id at 170, 29 S.E.2d at 556.
17. Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium & Asheville Agriculture School, 234 N.C. 222, 67 S.E.2d
57 (1951); Gray v. Weinstein, 227 N.C. 463, 42 S.E.2d 616 (1947); Covington v. James, 214 N.C.
71, 197 S.E. 701 (1938).
18. Thornburg v. Long, 178 N.C. 589, 101 S.E. 99 (1919).
19. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
20. Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 203 S.E.2d 330, a]t'd, 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456
(1974) (equal division of six-member court required that court of appeals decision be affirmed
without becoming precedent).
21. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
22. Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116,72 S.E.2d 4 (1952) (during minor surgery major veins
and arteries were perforated, resulting in the amputation of both legs, a heart attack, and drug
addiction; evidence held sufficient seemingly without expert testimony); but cf. Connor v.
Haywarth, 206 N.C. 721, 175 S.E. 140 (1934) (plaintiff's evidence showed that his leg was broken
above and below knee, that defendant set lower break but, despite plaintiff's repeated complaints,
did not set or otherwise treat upper break, that weights attached to leg with tape pulled off and
were not reattached for long periods of time, and that tape's pulling off tore away skin to the bone;
absence of expert testimony held fatal to claim).
23. Boyd v. Kistler, 270 N.C. 744, 155 S.E.2d 208 (1967) (red streak on patient's cheek and lip
when she awoke after surgical extraction of teeth); Lentz v. Thompson, 269 N.C. 188, 152 S.E.2d
107 (1967) (severance of spinal accessory nerve an inherent risk of carefully performed biopsy);
Boger v. Ader, 222 N.C. 758, 23 S.E.2d 852 (1943) (adverse reaction to medicine); Lippard v.
Johnson, 215 N.C. 384, 1 S.E.2d 889 (1939) (stinging sensation from novocaine injection and painful skin condition at injection site).
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his patient a lap pack, 24 a sponge, 2 5 or a jagged piece of glass from a broken
test tube.26 Expert evidence is not required in cases of clear neglect of or inattention to the patient by the doctor, because resolving such cases does not
require any understanding of technical medical knowledge and skill or their
application. 27 In some cases, although expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care, lay testimony will suffice to permit the .jury to find
noncompliance with it.28 Finally, when the experts disagree concerning the
appropriateness of particular treatment or procedures employed, the question
of the doctor's negligence is left to the jury even though its29determination falls
outside the realm of common knowledge and experience.
This view of customary practice and the authority of the cases applying it
should not be affected by the codification of the customary practice standard.
Although, under the statute, 30 liability can be imposed only when the care
provided is inconsistent with customary practice, nothing in the statute suggests that the legislature intended to introduce a concept of customary practice
different from that developed by judicial decision. The report of the study
commission recommending statutory adoption of the customary practice standard furnishes additional evidence in support of this view. It provides as
follows:
The North Carolina Supreme Court has gone only as far as a
same or similar communities' standard of care, and the Commission
recommends that this concept be enacted into the General Statutes to
avoid further interpretation by the Supreme Court which might3lead
to regional or National standards for all health care providers. '
Thie quote makes clear that the study commission's concern was directed to
the choice between a national or regional standard and the same or similar
communities standard rather than to the general concept of customary practice. In fact, the same or similar communities recommendation is expressly
related to the earlier judicially developed standard. Finally, the study commission's rejection of proposals to limit or preclude the use of res #7sa loquitur
24. Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
25. Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941).

26. Pendergraft v. Royster, 203 N.C. 384, 166 S.E. 285 (1932). Other cas-s upholding a cause
of action under similar circumstances are Blaine v. Lyle, 213 N.C. 529, 196 S.E. 833 (1938) (drop-

ping metal probe into plural cavity) (dictum); Hyder v. Weilbaecher, 54 N.C. App. 287, 283 S.E.2d
426 (eight inch wire left in patients body), cert. denied, 304 N.C. 727, 288 S.E.2d 804 (1981).
27. Wilson v. Martin Memorial Hosp., 232 N.C. 362, 61 S.E.2d 102 (1950) (failure to treat

lacerations caused by child delivery and failure to discover torn stitches and decomposed tissue

before discharging patient); Gray v. Weinstein, 227 N.C. 463, 42 S.E.2d 616 (1947) (11 hour delay
in attending infant who had eaten 12 aspirin tablets); Groce v. Myers, 224 N.C. 165, 166, 29 S.E.2d
553, 554 (1944) (doctor told father of patient with broken arm to "just. . . tie something around it
and let it hang down"); Gower v. Davidian, 212 N.C. 172, 193 S.E. 28 (1937) (fracture and dislocated vertebrae; failure to make X-ray or clinical examination before releasing patient).
28. Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium &Asheville Agriculture School, 234 N.C. 222,67 S.E.2d
57 (1951); Smithers v. Collins, 52 N.C. App. 255, 278 S.E.2d 286, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 546, 281
S.E.2d 394 (1981).
29. Groce, 224 N.C. at 171, 29 S.E.2d at 557-58.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981).
31. LIABILrrY INsURANCE STUDY, supra note 2, at 32.
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in malpractice cases is clear evidence that it did not intend its recommendation
to make expert evidence of customary practice the exclusive method of proof
32
in such cases.

A narrower view of the customary practice standard is sometimes urged,
and the contention is made that, even when the issues involved are within the
realm of common knowledge and experience, malpractice cannot be established without expert testimony that the defendant's conduct deviated from
customary practice. Although this view was rejected by the court under the
common-law standard, 33 two law review comments apparently interpret the
statute to give added significance to customary practice in the determination of
malpractice liability. 34 In addition, the interpretation of the statute in certain
court of appeals cases, decided after adoption of the statute, seems somewhat
ambiguous.
The decision in Pate v. Trpp35 suggests that expert evidence of customary
practice is required by the statute in all malpractice cases. The following quotation reflects this attitude:
First, plaintiff argues she presented evidence the hospital was
negligent in not reporting promptly the results of certain tests ordered by plaintiffs doctors after her surgery, thereby causing a delay
in the diagnosis of plaintiffs condition. In order to withstand a motion for directed verdict on this issue, however, plaintiff was required
by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.12

. .

. to offer some evidence that the

care of the defendant hospital was not in accordance with the standards of practice among other hospitals in the same or similar communities. Plaintiff failed to present any evidence of the standard of
care for a hospital in Kinston or36similar communities regarding time
necessary to report test results.

Although the court held the absence of expert evidence of customary practice
to be fatal, it is not clear whether the court believed that such evidence was
mandated by the customary practice standard, by the legislature's codification
of the standard, or by the view that the issues involved fell outside the jury's
competence. 37 Disagreement with the opinion can be expressed on any of
32. Id at 26.
33. Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium & Asheville Agriculture School, 234 N.C. 222, 67 S.E.2d
57 (1951); Gray v. Weinstein, 227 N.C. 463, 42 S.E.2d 616 (1947); Covington v. James, 214 N.C.
71, 197 S.E. 701 (1938).
34. Comment, StatutoryStandardof CareforNorth CarolinaHealth CareProviders, 1 CAMPBELL L. Rnv. 111, 125-29 (1979); Comment, Medical Malpracticein North Carolina, 54 N.C.L.
REv. 1214, 1222-23 (1976). These comments suggest, respectively, that the statute makes compli-

ance with customary practice a "presumptive" or "absolute" defense. These defense characterizations leave unclear their view of the effect of the statute in determining the sufficiency of plaintifi's
evidence when proof of customary practice has not been introduced.
35. 49 N.C. App. 329, 271 S.E.2d 407 (1980).
36. Id. at 333, 271 S.E.2d at 409-10.
37. The determination whether a hospital has unreasonably delayed in reporting the results
of laboratory tests seems to be clearly within the competence of the jury. Proof of the time required to conduct such tests and to prepare reports, along with evidence of the work load of the
laboratory, may be necessary. When these facts are shown, however, the jury can determine
whether the delay was unreasonable. Depending upon the circumstances, proof of these facts may

be given by a lay witness or may require expert testimony. The need for expert evidence to estab-
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these grounds, but the importance of the case decreases substantially if it is
based solely on the view that the evidence presented complex medical issues.
The effect of the decision, if interpreted to be based on either of the other two
of expert evidence of
grounds, would be to impose an absolute requirement
33
customary practice in any malpractice case.
Similar uncertainties are inherent in the decision in Tice v. Hall.39 Tice
involved a classic res ipsa loquitur situation-a surgeon left a sponge in the
patient-in which proof of customary practice has not been required. Nevertheless, the court strained to find evidence that customary practice entailed a
search for sponges by the surgeon before the incision was closed. Finding such
evidence in the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness that "it is in accordance
with my standard practice to make a systematic search '4° and defendant's testimony that he "looked at all the organs to make sure there [was] no foreign
body within the patient,"'4 ' the court held that plaintiff could rely on res isa
loquitur to show breach of the standard.
The court's analysis in Tice may have been prompted by the testimony of
plaintiffs expert witness that customary practice permitted a surgeon to rely
on the nurse's sponge count.42 The court, in light of this testimony, apparently
believed that a finding of malpractice was permissible only if an independent
duty of inspection by the surgeon was also imposed by customary practice.
The logic of the court's position, although initially appealing, does not withstand careful scrutiny. Common sense dictates that a surgeon search for
sponges before closing an incision and jurors need no expert to inform them of
this. If, as the court held, the presence of the sponge will permit an inference
lish basic facts and the necessity for proof of customary practice should not be confused, and the
latter should be required only in cases in which it is essential to the jury's understanding and

resolttion of the case.
38. In Page v. Wilson Memorial Hosp., 49 N.C. App. 533, 272 S.E.2d 8 (1980), plaintiff, a 69

year old patient who was physically impaired and who had "experienced periods of confusion and
mental dullness," id. at 533, 272 S.E.2d at 9, was injured when she fell from a bedpan which had
been placed in a chair. Plaintiff alleged that the attending nurse was negligent in leaving the room
on several occasions while plaintiff was in this position. The trial judge's exclusion of expert
testimony that defendant's conduct was inconsistent with customary nursing practice was reversed. This disposition of the case made it unnecessary for the court to address the question
whether expert testimony was required to establish negligence under these circumstances. Nonetheless, the case is of interest because, as far as can be determined, neither plaintiffs attorney, the
trial judge, nor the court of appeals considered the possibility that the facts of the case, without
expert evidence of customary practice, would be sufficient to permit the jury to infer the nurse's
negligence. Yet, common sense suggests that the jury, under the circumstances shown, could reasonably infer the nurse's negligence without being assisted by evidence of customary practice.
39. 63 N.C. App. 27, 303 S.E.2d 832 (1983).
40. Id. at 30, 303 S.E.2d at 834.
41. Id. at 35, 303 S.E.2d at 837.
42. The importance of this testimony is suggested by the differing views of Judge Becton in
Tice and in Hyder v. Weilbaecher, 54 N.C. App. 287,283 S.E.2d 426 (1981), cert. denied,304 N.C.
727, 288 S.E.2d 804 (1982). In Hyder he concurred in an opinion that applied res ipsa loquitur to
proof that a wire was left in a patient after an operation and that held erroneous a jury instruction
requiring expert testimony of customary practice. In Tice Judge Becton dissented: "Because the
evidence shows that the standard of practice is for the surgeon to rely on the sponge counts provided by operating room nurses and that [defendant] did that in the case subjudice, I believe the
trial court correctly granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict." 63 N.C. App. at 38, 303
S.E.2d at 838.
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that it could have been discovered by reasonable inspection, the law surely
will impose upon surgeons the duty to conduct a reasonable search. The idea
that surgeons rely exclusively on the nurses' sponge counts without conducting
their own inspections seems hardly credible. The need for and conduct of such
a search does not involve weighty matters of medical sense, exercise of the
surgeon's expert discretion, or imposition of a substantial obligation on the
surgeon's time.
The implications of Tice are disturbing. It may be interpreted to require
proof of customary practice even when the jury, unaided by experts, is competent to judge the reasonableness of a physician's conduct. Further, this interpretation seems to require the conclusion that compliance with customary
practice, no matter how unreasonable that practice may be, cannot constitute
malpractice.
Other court of appeals decisions recognize that in appropriate cases malpractice can be established without expert evidence of customary practice. In
Hyder . Wetbaecher,43 in which a surgeon left an eight and one-half inch
wire in a patient, the court held that res &psaloquitur applied to permit an
inference of the surgeon's negligence. It also held erroneous an instruction44
by the trial judge that the jury could find the standard of care only "through
evidence presented by practitioners who were called as expert witnesses":
"The facts of this case gave rise to the inference that the defendant doctor did
not exercise due care. By imposing an external standard established by expert
testimony, the trial court essentially negated this inference to plaintiffs
prejudice. '45 In another case, Smithers v. Collins,46 the court held that lay
testimony was adequate to show a doctor's failure to follow certain procedures
that experts had testified were performed customarily. Further, extensive dictum4 7 in the case indicates that expert testimony of customary practice would
be unnecessary in any case in which the jury, based upon common knowledge
and experience, could understand and evaluate the doctor's conduct.
43. 54 N.C. App. 287, 283 S.E.2d 426 (1981), cert. denied, 304 N.C. 727, 288 S.E.2d 804
(1982).
44. Unfortunately, the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions uses a res ipsa loquitor fact

situation in a model instruction illustrating the appropriate charge on the standard of care in
medical malpractice cases. NORTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES,
NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES 809.00 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as N.C.P.I.].
45. Hyder, 54 N.C. App. at 292, 283 S.E.2d at 429.
46. 52 N.C. App. 255, 278 S.E.2d 286, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 546, 281 S.E.2d 394 (1981)
(standard of care established by expert testimony that pelvic and stethoscopic examinations required when intestinal obstruction suspected; breach could be established by lay testimony that
neither examination was performed).
47. The court stated:
[E]xpert testimony is generally required when the standard of care and proximate cause
are matters involving highly specialized knowledge beyond the ken of laymen. It has
never been the rule in this State, however, that expert testimony is needed in all medical
malpractice cases to establish either the standard of care or proximate cause. Indeed,
when the jury, based on its common knowledge and experience, is able to understand
and judge the action of a physician or surgeon, expert testimony is not needed.
Id. at 260, 278 S.E.2d at 289.
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One other case, although decided prior to enactment of the statute, merits
consideration. In Norris v. Rowan MemorialHospital48 an elderly and sedated

hospital patient was injured after falling while attempting to use the bathroom
at night. Plaintiff alleged that a nurse employed by the hospital was negligent
in failing to raise the rails on her bed and to instruct her to use the call button
to obtain assistance in going to the bathroom. Expert evidence of customary
practice was not introduced by plaintiff. The court, in reversing a directed
verdict for defendant, said:
Where, as here, the alleged breach of duty did not involve the rendering or failure to render professional nursing or medical services
requiring special skills, expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff as
to the standards of due care prevailing among hospitals in like situations is not necessary to develop a case of negligence for the jury.
Under the factual situations here presented the jury was fully capable
without aid of49expert opinion to apply the standard of the reasonably
prudent man.
The Norris case is important because it carefully relates the need for expert testimony to the particular facts and the jury's ability to understand them.
Such a careful factual analysis is not present in some of the other cases and, as
a result, the court's reliance on the general rule that expert testimony is needed
creates uncertainty. Because the other cases involve facts that the jury seemed
capable of assessing, the danger exists that they could be regarded as precedent requiring expert testimony in all malpractice actions.5 0
A failure of the court, in applying the statute, to recognize the true basis
for the customary practice standard would be unfortunate. To equate customary practice with doctors' usual practices fails to relate their conduct to the
superior knowledge they hold themselves out to possess and confers a special
privilege on the profession to establish its own standard of care. To permit
doctors or other professionals to escape liability by following a customary
practice that is obviously unreasonable conflicts with both policy and precedent. 5 ' Furthermore, the reasonableness of a practice customarily followed in
the profession is seldom an issue in a case. The issue usually presented is
whether the absence of expert testimony of customary practice is fatal to a
malpractice claim even when the jury has sufficient understanding and knowl48. 21 N.C. App. 623, 205 S.E.2d 345 (1974).
49. Id. at 626, 205 S.E.2d at 348. In Ballance v. Wentz, 22 N.C. App. 363, 206 S.E.2d 734,
aff'd, 286 N.C. 294, 210 S.E.2d 390 (1974), another prestatutory case, the majority and dissent
adopted different views of the jury's capability to determine the reasonableness of a physicians'
conduct when a traction rig suspending plaintiff's broken arm collapsed.
50. See, e.g., Tice, 63 N.C. App. 27,303 S.E.2d 832 (sponge left in patient; proof that customary practice required surgeon to search for sponges vital under particular facts); Page v. Wilson
Memorial Hosp., 49 N.C. App. 533, 272 S.E.2d 8 (1980) (disoriented patient fell from bedpan in
chair;, remanded for improper exclusion of testimony that absence of attendant inconsistent with
customary practice); Tripp v. Pate, 49 N.C. App. 329, 271 S.E.2d 407 (1980) (whether delay in
reporting laboratory results unreasonable; absence of evidence of customary practice held fatal
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981) (requiring such proof in medical malpractice cases)).
51. Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (ophthalmologist negligent as
matter of law for failing to give glaucoma test to low risk patient despite uncontradicted testimony
that such failure was in accord with universal practice).
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edge to judge the reasonableness of the conduct involved. Undoubtedly, the
issues involved in many malpractice cases are beyond the competence of the
jury so that.expert testimony is essential. When common sense permits the
jury to understand and evaluate the conduct, however, insistence upon expert
proof of customary practice serves only to create an unreasonable and artificial
barrier to recovery.
Recognition that the customary practice standard does not require introduction of expert evidence when the jury is competent to understand and
judge the reasonableness of defendant's conduct assumes even greater importance in light of the statute's broad definition of health care providers to whom
the standard will apply.52 Because the level of skill and expertise of many of
these health care providers is less than that possessed by physicians, common
knowledge and experience may permit, at least in some cases, the jury to judge
the reasonableness of their conduct. In addition, they are likely to perform
many activities that, although related to the provision of medical services, involve no application of technical skills and are therefore as readily understood
by lay persons as by experts.
II.

EXPANDED APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY PRACTICE STANDARD

North Carolina General Statutes section 90-21.11 defines health care provider to include:
[Amny person who pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 90 of the
General Statutes is licensed, or is otherwise registered or certified to
engage in the practice of or otherwise performs duties associated with
any of the following: medicine, surgery, dentistry, pharmacy, optometry, midwifery, osteopathy, podiatry, chiropractic, radiology, nursing, physiotherapy, pathology, anesthesiology, anesthesiai, laboratory
analysis, rendering assistance to a physician, dental hygiene, psychiatry, psychology; or a hospital. . . ; or a nursing home. . . ; or any
other person who is legally responsible for the negligence of such
person, hospital or nursing home; or any other person acting at the
direction or under the supervision
of any of the foregoing persons,
53
hospital, or nursing home.
Although the breadth of this definition is apparent, a few observations
about its coverage may be appropriate. First, members of a variety of occupational groups are declared to be health care providers. Among these groups
exist vast differences in the levels of skill, knowledge, training, education, and
expertise possessed and the nature of activities performed. The qualifications
and activities of some, such as the physician, surgeon, and dentist, are encompassed by the traditional view of the medical professional. Others, such as
chiropractors and podiatrists, although generally regarded as less well qualified by education and training, have customarily been accorded a status similar to that of the physician. Nurses and other physicians' assistants engage in a
52. See infra text accompanying note 53.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 90-21.11

(1981).
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variety of activities that may or may not involve professional medical skills. A
variety of persons working in hospitals, nursing homes, and laboratories may
be unskilled or semi-skilled or may be involved in administrative rathbr than
medical activities. The same may be true for members of other groups who
are health care providers because they "perform duties associated with" any of
the occupational activities listed, are "legally responsible for" the negligence
of another health care provider, or act "at the direction or under the supervision of" a health care provider.
The purpose of the statute is to fix the standard of care in tort actions
54
arising out of the provision of health care. The two substantive provisions
establish the customary practice standard of care for treatment and informed
consent cases. Because the definition of health care provider is important only
in relation to these substantive provisions, the apparent effect of the statute is
to apply the customary practice standard to all health care providers.
An amendment ss to the Medical Malpractice Actions bill while it was
under consideration by the General Assembly, however, indicates a legislative
intent to restrict application of the customary practice standard more narrowly
than the definition of health care provider suggests. The original bill applied
the customary practice standard "in any action. . . arising out of the furnishing of or failure to furnish medical, dental or other health care .
"...,,56The
amendment restricted the provision's application to "the furnishing or failure
to furnish professionalservices in the performance of medical, dental, or other
health care ....
,,57 At the very least, this additional phrase would seem to
exclude administrative, housekeeping, and related support activities. This interpretation leaves intact the definition of health care provider in the preceding section. At the other extreme, an interpretation of the new language to
restrict the statute's coverage to the traditional professions would conflict directly with the statute's own definition of health care provider. If the legislature intended this result, presumably a more limited definition of health care
provider would have been used for this purpose. Unfortunately, little middle
ground exists between these interpretations. If the definition section is to remain intact, activities related to "laboratory analysis, rendering assistance to a
physician, dental hygiene," and those of a nursing home attendant, for example, must be regarded as "professional services."
Theoretical and practical considerations argue against broadly applying
the customary practice standard the legislature apparently has adopted.
Adoption of the customary practice standard for physicians and related professionals is an exception to the general unwillingness of courts to permit the
customs and practices of a group to establish the standard of care for determining tort liability of its members. The North Carolina decisions have iden54. Id. §§ 90-21.12 to .13.
55. H.B. 1293, Gen. Assembly of 1975, 2d Sess. § 4 (1976) (incorporating amendment 2 of

May 6, 1976) (codified at N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 90-21.12 (1981)).

56. Id. (original version before amendments).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
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tified two primary reasons for this exception. One justification, particularly
relied upon in early cases but less important
today, was effectively set forth by
58
Justice Seawell in Groce v. Myers:
The usual argument which has relegated the decision of malpractice
cases to the opinion of professional men.

. .

as distinguished from

the jury, is that the practice of medicine and surgery is empiricwhich means that it has not yet become a matter of scientific knowledge or proceeding. The implication is that only a doctor can know
from his own actuarial or statistical experience, or that of others
handed down to him, what is good or bad practice in any case. On
this theory the doctor, instead of being an expert in scientific learning
and methods, is an expert in the trial and error results which are
nowhere available except in the arena of the profession.5 9
The second justification is based upon an entirely different view of medical
practice. It was stated succinctly by Justice Barnhill in Jackson v. Mountain
60
Sanitarium & Asheville Agriculture School:
Usually, what is the standard of care required of a physician or surgeon is one concerning highly specialized knowledge with respect to
which a layman can have no reliable information. As to this, both
the court and jury must be dependent
on expert testimony. Ordina6
rily there can be no other guide. '
Obviously, these reasons for the customary practice exception do not apply to
many of the groups included within the definition of health care provider. As
pointed out earlier, 62 not only highly skilled experts, but also unskilled individuals and a variety of other persons who in terms of skill and qualification
range between the two, come within the definition. For many of these, expert
evidence is not required to inform the jury of the qualifications such individuals must possess or to enable it to judge the reasonableness 'of their conduct.
Reason to exclude them from the reasonable and prudent person standard
simply does not exist.
Serious practical problems arise if the customary practice standard is applied indiscriminately to any individual who "performs duties associated
with" health care. The concept of customary practice entails some type of
professional group for which a common body of knowledge exists, certain
practices and procedures are generally accepted, and among whose members
general dissemination of the knowledge, practices, and procedures occurs.
Customary practice involves more than merely the usual way of doing something. Grave doubts exist that a customary practice in this sense can be identified for many of the groups included in the definition of health care provider.
Under the customary practice standard, plaintiff, to establish a cause of
action in most cases, must introduce expert testimony that defendant's conduct
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

224 N.C. 165, 29 S.E.2d 553 (1944).
Id. at 169, 29 S.E.2d at 556.
234 N.C. 222, 67 S.E.2d 57 (1951).
Id. at 226-27, 67 S.E.2d at 61.
See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
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deviated from customary practice. 63 Insistence on such testimony when the
group lacks the characteristics set out in the preceding paragraph will likely
result in presentation of the witness' own practice in the guise of customary
practice. Even in this context, finding an expert witness may be difficult. Because the experience of many individuals in these groups will be limitedoften restricted to a single institution or setting-they may well question their
own competence to testify about customary practice. Further, members of
these groups may be even more reluctant than doctors to testify against their
colleagues.
Interpreting the statute to limit proof of negligence exclusively to expert
evidence of customary practice in actions against health care providers is
likely to create uncertainty, promote litigation, and result in unfair decisions
on the liability issue. Even if the traditional, less restrictive view of customary
practice advocated earlier is adopted, substantial difficulties will be encountered under this provision of the statute. Contrary to the apparent purpose of
the statute, resolution of claims against some health care providers will probably be more burdensome and expensive than under prior law.
III.

CUSTOMARY PRACTICE IN TREATMENT CASES

North Carolina General Statutes section 90-21.12 provides:
In any action for damages for personal injury or death arising
out of the furnishing or the failure to furnish professional services in
the performance of medical, dental, or other health care, the defendant shall not be liable for the payment of damages unless the trier of

the facts is satisfied by the greater weight of the evidence that the
care of such health care provider was not in accordance with the
standards of practice among members of the same health care profession with similar training and experience situated in the same or similar communities at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause
of action.64
The customary practice standard is not a monolithic standard uniformly
applied to all malpractice actions. A practitioner is held to the customary
practice in his area of medicine. 65 A physician engaged in family practice is
judged by customary practice in family medicine. The higher level of training
and education of various specialists is taken into account and each is judged
by the customary practice in his speciality. 66 To the extent that society permits
practice of the healing arts by individuals who lack the full credentials of a
regular physician, the conduct of each is measured by the customary practice
63. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955); Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C.
App. 50, 247 S.E.2d 287 (1978).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981).

65. Whitehurst v. Boehm, 41 N.C. App. 670, 673-74, 255 S.E.2d 761, 765 (1979) (customary
practice of orthopedic surgeon inappropriate standard in determining podiatrist's negligence).
66. Koury v. Folio, 272 N.C. 366, 372-73, 158 S.E.2d 548, 554 (1968); Belk v. Schweizer, 268
N.C. 50, 56, 149 S.E.2d 565, 569-70 (1966).
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of the particular school to which he belongs. 67
Another variable in the customary practice standard reflects the perception that the level of sophistication of practice in a particular field of medicine
varies with the surrounding environment. The principle involved is illustrated
by the often repeated statement that a country doctor should not be held to the
standard of a big city practitioner. The differences that justified this distinction were based upon general observation rather than proof in any specific
case. The assumptions that supported this distinction became the basis for the
locality rule under which conduct was assessed on the basis of customary practice in the locality in which a defendant practiced.
The number of adherents to the locality rule declined as advances in medical science, stricter regulation of the medical profession, and improvements in
medical education and practice removed many of the factors that earlier contributed to different levels of quality in practice. The prevailing standard became customary practice in the "same or similar community" and a trend
toward a national standard developed. 68 This trend was arrested, if not reversed, by medical malpractice legislation adopted by many states in the mid1970s in response to the malpractice insurance crisis. Today, a majority of
jurisdictions follow the same or similar community rule. Its adoption, however, may reflect as much the perception that malpractice liability can be curtailed by excluding the testimony of outside experts as the belief that real
differences in the quality of practice exist.
In 1970 North Carolina judicially adopted the same or similar community
rule.69 The court, in doing so, assumed that the locality rule had been in effect
prior to that time. Whether this assumption was consistent with prior practice
is unknown; little evidence in appellate decisions supports it, however. Discussion in earlier cases, although not directed to the specific issue under consideration, described the customary practice standard in very broad terms.
Descriptions used to characterize the standard have included the care and skill
such as is "'ordinarily possessed by the average member of the profession' ",70
and such "reasonable skill and diligence as is ordinarily exercised in his profession. '71 There is only one case72 in which the locality rule was even mentioned, and in that case the court was addressing the form of the hypothetical
question asked a witness rather than the locality rule per se. The closest the
court came to dealing with the issue was in McCracken v. Smathers,7 3 in which
the court upheld the refusal of the trial court to give defendant's requested
instruction that "the care and skill required... is... such as is possessed by
67. Hardy v. DahL, 210 N.C. 530, 534, 187 S.E. 788, 790 (1936).
68. 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 8.06, at 211 (1983).

69. Wiggins v. Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 139-41, 171 S.E.2d 393, 396-98 (1970).
70. Long v. Austin, 153 N.C. 508, 511, 69 S.E. 500, 501 (1910) (quoting McCracken v.
Smathers, 122 N.C. 799, 803, 29 S.E. 354, 355 (1898)).
71. Brewer v. Ring, 177 N.C. 476, 488, 99 S.E. 358, 364 (1919).
72. Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 264, 72 S.E.2d 589, 593 (1952).
73. 122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E. 354 (1898).
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men of his profession in the neighborhood."74 The court said:
The degree of care and skill required is that possessed and exercised
by the ordinary members of his profession. .... It cannot be measured simply by the profession in the neighborhood, as this standard
of measurement would be entirely too variable and uncertain.
"Neighborhood" might be construed into a very limited area, and is
generally so understood among our people. It might contain but few
dentists, in sparsely settled sections perhaps only one or two. Both
might be men of very inferior qualifications, and to say that they
might set themselves up as the standard of a learned profession, and
prove the standing of each by the ability of the other, would be
equally unjust to the profession and to its patients. . . In the wellconsidered case of Gramm v. Booner, 56 Ind. 497, 501, the Court says:
"It seems to us that physicians or surgeons practicing in small towns,
or rural or sparsely populated districts, are bound to possess and exercise at least the average degree of skill possessed and exercised by
the profession in such localities generally. It will not do, as we think,
to say that if a surgeon or physician has exercised such a degree of
skill as is ordinarily exercised '75in the particularlocality in which he
practices, it will be sufficient."
This historical excursion is beside the point because, whatever the law may
have been, the same or similar community rule has since been adopted by first
76
the court and then the legislature.
The North Carolina statute seems to incorporate a third variable in the
customary practice standard. It provides that negligence is to be determined
by "standards of practice among members of the same health care profession
with similartrainingand experience situated in the same or similar communities. .... ,"77 The emphasized language suggests that the standard for determining liability of a general practitioner in practice for ten years would differ
from that for one in practice for only two years. Such an interpretation of the
statute would result at best in continuous litigation concerning the similarity of
a witness' experience to defendant's or at worst in a subjective standard that
practically would preclude finding liability.
In Lowery v. Newton 7 8 the "similar training and experience" language
was omitted from the hypothetical question relating to customary practice put
to plaintiff's witness and from the trial judge's instruction to the jury. The
court of appeals held that neither omission was prejudicial error. In regard to
its omission from the hypothetical question, the court said: "To contend that
the substitution of 'under the same or similar circumstances' in lieu of 'with
similar training and experience' is significant, places form over substance.
Such technical error is harmless. '79 The alleged error in the jury instruction
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 802, 29 S.E. at 355.
Id. at 803-04, 29 S.E. at 355-56.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981).
Id. (emphasis added).
52 N.C. App. 234, 278 S.E.2d 566, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 195, 291 S.E.2d 148 (1981).

79. Id. at 238, 278 S.E.2d at 570.
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was dealt with in a similar manner:
Defendants argue that since the enactment of this statute in 1975
only a literal interpretation of the wording will suffice. We do not
agree. It is the concept expressed by the words of the statute which
controls. The words "similarly situated" can easily encompass not
only geographic location, but also standing within a profession. 80
Although the court disposed of the issues in Lowery in a sensible way,
problems remain. The decision leaves largely unresolved whether the customary practice standard against which a defendant's conduct is measured must
reflect his level of training and experience and how this factor will be reflected
in the qualification of expert witnesses. The decision does not reject "training
and experience" as an element of customary practice but only finds the "similarly situated" instruction sufficient to "encompass

. . .

standing within a

profession." 8'
The court of appeals, in a case not involving medical malpractice, 82has
recognized the inappropriateness of such a limit on the standard of care.
The trial court improperly introduced a subjective standard of
care into the definition of negligence by referring to the "ordinary
care and caution, which an ordinary prudent pilot having the same
trainingand experience as FredHeath, would have used in the same
or similar circumstances."
[O]bjective standards avoid the evil of imposing a different standard of care upon each individual. The instructions in this case...
are misleading at best, and a misapplication of the law. They permit
the jury to consider Fred Heath's own particular experience and
training, whether outstanding or inferior, in determining the requisite standard of conduct, rather than applying a minimum standard
generally applicable to all pilots. The plaintiff is entitled to an into the objective minimum standard of
struction holding Fred Heath
83
care applicable to all pilots.
The court's analysis applies equally to the malpractice standard of care.
Incorporation of "similar training and experience" into the customary practice
standard would effectively eliminate any minimum standard of care to which
health care providers will be held. The unfortunate consequences of this result
would be compounded by the greatly expanded application of the customary
practice standard dictated by the statute. Apart from the question of fairness it
would present, such a limited standard of care would pose significant
problems in qualifying an expert witness to testify on customary practice.
What factors would be relevant to determining if experience is similar? Could
a family practitioner in practice for ten years establish the standard of care
applicable to one in practice for two years? What would constitute similar
80. Id. at 242, 278 S.E.2d at 573.
81. Id.
82. Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 158, 252 S.E.2d 526, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 453,
256 S.E.2d 806 (1979).
83. Id. at 163, 252 S.E.2d at 529.
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training? Would the quality of medical schools and hospitals in which education and residency training were acquired be relevant?
Serious grounds exist, therefore, to question whether the legislature intended the "similar training and experience" language to introduce another
variable in the customary practice standard. Because this interpretation eliminates, for practical purposes, the idea of a minimum standard of care-an idea
that is basic to all negligence law-and poses extreme practical difficulties in
the application of the customary practice standard, it should be adopted only
if no other reasonable interpretation is possible. That the statute, if interpreted
in this way, conflicts with prior law also supports this conclusion.
A reasonable interpretation that avoids all of these consequences is possible. The statute can be read to include two, rather than three, elements in the
customary practice standard: (1) "members of the same health care profession
with similar training and experience" and (2) "situated in the same or similar
communities." Under this reading, the phrase "similar training and experience" modifies "same health care profession" and serves the legitimate purpose of distinguishing between the general practitioner and the specialist, and
among various specialists---distinctions that were recognized in prior law. This
interpretation also is supported by the substitution of the phrase "similar training and experience" for the phrase "in his field of practice" incident to a
broader amendment to the bill while it was being considered by the legislature.8 4 In this context, the phrase has a clear meaning, serves a useful purpose,
and is consistent with prior law. On the other hand, if it is interpreted to
introduce a separate variable in customary practice, its meaning is unclear, it
undermines a basic principle of negligence law, and it introduces a novel concept to medical malpractice. The choice of interpretations seems obvious.
Against this background, it is unfortunate that the North Carolina Pattern
Jury Instructions85 include the "similar training and experience" language as a
separate element of the standard of care. For example, in defining negligence
for a general practitioner, the instructions state: "[T]hat care must only be in
accordance with the standards of practice among general practitioners with
similar training and experience .... 8 6 The applicable standard under this
instruction is not that standard prevailing among general practitioners but a
more limited one that considers only "general practitioners with similar training and experience." Under the better interpretation, general practice is the
health care profession, all of whose members must have "similar training and
experience," to which this individual belongs; once this determination is made,
the importance of similar training and experience is spent. An instruction on
similar training and experience, such as that in the pattern instruction,
would
87
be unnecessary and if given would likely constitute reversible error.
84. H.B. 1293, Gen. Assembly of 1975, 2d Sess. § 4 (1976) (incorporating amendment 7 of
May 7, 1976) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981)).
85. N.C.P.I., supra note 44, at 809.00 (1981).
86. N.C.P.I., supra note 44, at 809.05 (1980).
87. See Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 158, 252 S.E.2d 526, cert. denied, 297 N.C.
453, 256 S.E.2d 806 (1979).
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The primary reason given by the study commission for recommending
codification of the same or similar community standard was "to avoid further
interpretation by the Supreme Court which might lead to regional or national
standards for all health care providers. 8 8 It would be ironic if the most far
reaching change effected by the Medical Malpractice Actions legislation resulted from judicial misinterpretation of the legislation.
IV.

QUALIFYING THE EXPERT UNDER THE CUSTOMARY
PRACTICE STANDARD

Medical skills and practice are generally beyond the understanding of lay
persons, so expert testimony is usually required to establish malpractice.8 9 Because customary practice is the standard of care in malpractice cases, to establish negligence the expert's testimony must show that the defendant's conduct
deviated from customary practice. 90 Generally, familiarity with the customary practice that is the standard of care in the particular case is the essential
91
qualification the expert must possess in order to testify.

The North Carolina statute relates the customary practice standard to (1)
members of the same health care profession (2) situated in the same or similar
communities (3) at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action.92 This enumeration assumes that the "similar training and experience"
language in the statute simply identifies the relevant health care profession. 93
If this interpretation is wrong, similar training and experience would be a
fourth factor to be considered. As a witness' familiarity with the relevant customary practice is necessary to qualify him as an expert who can testify that
defendant's conduct was negligent, it may be helpful to inquire how each of
these factors relate to the witness' qualification.
4. Same Health CareProfession
The usual and safest practice is to call as witnesses members of the same
health care profession. Departure from this practice may result in exclusion of
the witness' testimony or, if it is admitted, a low estimation of its value by the
jury. It is entirely conceivable, however, that a physician could be familiar
with customary nursing practice or a specialist with customary practice for
family practitioners, particularly in relation to treatments or disorders that
overlap his area of specialty. When such familiarity exists, admission of the
testimony would seem to be permissible. The witness' testimony, of course,
must concern customary practice in defendant's area of medicine and not his
88. LIABILITY INSURANCE STUDY,supra note 2, at 32.
89. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955); Connor v. Hayworth, 206 N.C.
721, 175 S.E. 140 (1934); Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 247 S.E.2d 287 (1978).
90. Tripp v. Pate, 49 N.C. App. 329, 271 S.E.2d 407 (1980); Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C.
App. 50, 247 S.E.2d 287 (1978).
91. Lowery v. Newton, 52 N.C. App. 234, 278 S.E.2d 566, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 195, 291

S.E.2d 148 (1981); Whitehurst v. Boehm, 41 N.C. App. 670, 255 S.E.2d 761 (1979).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 77-87.
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own. Testimony directed to the witness' area of medicine should be excluded
as irrelevant to the standard of care applicable to the defendant.
The North Carolina cases give no clear answer on this issue. In Wphitehurst v. Boehm 94 exclusion by the trial court of testimony by an orthopedic
surgeon in a suit against a podiatrist was upheld. The court concluded:
We hold that, in malpractice cases, the applicable standard of care
for podiatrists and other "allied occupations" to medicine must be
established by other practitioners in the particular field of practice or
competent to testify
by other expert witnesses equally familiar and
95
with respect to that limited field of practice.
The proffered testimony in Whitehurst concerned customary practice of orthopedic surgeons and not that of podiatrists. Examination of the opinion clearly
shows that the basis for the decision was the inappropriateness of the standard
of care to which the testimony related rather than the witness' being an orthopedic surgeon. Despite the court's characterization of the quoted statement, it
probably should be considered dictum in view of the issue decided. In any
event, the statement indicates that testimony of persons outside of defendant's
area of practice may come in; it also suggests, however, by its emphasis on
"equally," that the test of the witness' familiarity with the relevant customary
practice will be stringent.
The court in Vassey v. Burch,96 a malpractice action against a nurse, held
that a physician's affidavit, which stated that accepted medical practice required that the patient be checked for appendicitis, was insufficient to preclude
summary judgment for the defendant. The basis for the decision was again
that the evidence related to an improper standard of care. The court concluded: "Although the affidavit of Dr. Stewart Todd may be sufficient to eshis office, it does
tablish the accepted standard of medical care for a doctor in ' 97
not establish the standard of care for a nurse in a hospital.

In Lowery v. Newton 98 the admission of a neurosurgeon's testimony in a
malpractice action against a plastic surgeon was upheld. It is unclear whether
this testimony related to customary practice of neurosurgeons or plastic surgeons. The court reasoned:
There is some overlapping in the various areas of health care.
The overriding area of medical care before us is surgery-not
plastic surgery alone or neurological surgery alone. The operation
involved some expertise by the surgeon in both areas. The prior experience and training of [the witness] as a general surgeon andplastic
surgeon is sufficient to qualify him to testify as an expert for the purpose of establishing the standard of care and breach thereof required
94. 41 N.C. App. 670, 255 S.E.2d 761 (1979).

95. Id. at 677, 255 S.E.2d at 767.
96. 45 N.C. App. 222, 262 S.E.2d 865, rev'd on othergrounds, 301 N.C. 68, 269 S.E.2d 137

(1980).
97. Id. at 226, 262 S.E.2d at 867.
98. 52 N.C. App. 234, 278 S.E.2d 566, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 195, 291 S.E.2d 148 (1981).
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in the case before us. 99

This brief statement of the court suggests two different ideas relating to the
qualification of the expert witness. First, it suggests that each area of specialization in a broad field of medical practice, such as surgery, will not necessarily
be regarded as sui generis in determining the qualification of an expert to testify about customary practice. Second, it indicates that when areas of medical
practice overlap, an expert in either area may be permitted to testify if the
treatment involves matters common to the two areas. In these situations, admission of the witness' testimony, even if it is related to customary practice in
his own area of practice, seems proper because little likelihood exists that its
admission will subject the defendant to an inappropriate, higher standard of
care.
B. Time and Underlying Basis of Knowledge
Customary practice prevailing at the time of the defendant's alleged malpractice is the standard of care to which a witness' testimony must be directed. 1° This time factor and the underlying basis for the expert's knowledge
are so closely related that they need to be examined together. The test of the
witness' qualification in these respects should be whether he has adequate
knowledge of customary practice to be of help to the jury. If he does, his
testimony should be admitted. His testimony should not be excluded because
there are witnesses who are better qualified or more knowledgable. Although
these factors may affect the jury's assessment of the evidence, they are not
proper grounds for its exclusion. That a witness' knowledge of customary
practice is based upon earlier training and experience should not necessarily
render him incompetent. While training and experience twenty years earlier
may provide an inadequate basis of knowledge of current practice, a similar
conclusion is not justified when the witness' training and experience occurred
only a few years earlier. Similar reasoning should apply in judging the adequacy of the source of the witness' knowledge. Actual practice is the obvious
way to acquire knowledge of current practice, but it is not the only way. In
reality, the practitioner's knowledge of the customary practice in the profession must, for the most part, come from sources other than his own practice.
That he is engaged in practice simply ensures the expertise, incentive, and
opportunity to keep abreast of professional developments.
The North Carolina cases seem consistent with this analysis. Although the
witness' knowledge of the customary practice existing at the time of the defendant's alleged malpractice must be shown, proof that he was engaged in
practice at that time is not required. 10 1 "It would be unduly restrictive. . . to
require an expert to have knowledge of the standard of care. . . at the time of
99. Id. at 239-40, 278 S.E.2d at 571.
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981).
101. See Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973); Simons v. Georgiade, 55
N.C. App. 483, 286 S.E.2d 596, cert. denied, 305 N.C. 587, 292 S.E.2d 571 (1982).
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the alleged act only by having practiced in the particular field at that time." 10 2
Witnesses have been found qualified to testify if at the time of the alleged
malpractice they were medical students, interns, or residents 0 3 still in training
for the area of medical practice to which their testimony related. In Williams
v. Reynolds, 104 a case involving veterinary malpractice, the trial court rejected
efforts to qualify the witness based on his knowledge of customary practice in
both similar communities and the particular community in which the defendant practiced. The court of appeals, in finding error, said:
Furthermore, to say that this veterinarian. . . cannot testify as
to the accepted medical standards prevailing in Wake County during
October and November 1975, simply because he did not begin practicing here until two months later, is fatuous. The fact that he was
not actually practicing in Wake County at the actual time of treatment is merely a factor for the jury to consider in deciding what
weight it will give to his testimony.105
The court has recognized that knowledge of customary practice may be
acquired through means other than formal practice. Personnel at teaching
hospitals may obtain sufficient knowledge of customary practice in other communities through the various activities in which they engage. Howard v.
Piver'0 6 indicates, although other grounds for the decision also exist, that a
doctor who practiced and taught at Memorial Hospital in Chapel Hill, but to
whom patients were referred and hospital records sent from throughout North
Carolina, was competent to testify regarding customary practice in communities similar to Jacksonville. In Page v. Wilson MemorialHospital'0 7 the court
of appeals, in sustaining the admission of testimony of a nurse in a malpractice
action against the hospital, cataloged the nurse's credentials. The one most
relevant to her familiarity with practice in similar communities was that "she
supervised student nurses in caring for patients" in several other county hospitals in eastern North Carolina.10 8 Knowledge acquired through residency or
other training 0 9 or through service as clinical director of a statewide medical
organization' 10 may provide sufficient familiarity with the relevant customary
practice. In Rucker v. High Point Memorial HospitalII' a witness who had
obtained knowledge of a relevant standard of care through service, seminars,
102. Simons v. Georgiade, 55 N.C. App. 483, 494-95, 286 S.E.2d 596, 603, cert. denied, 305
N.C. 587, 292 S.E.2d 571 (1982).
103. See, eg., Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973); Spillman v. Forsyth
Memorial Hosp., 30 N.C. App. 406, 227 S.E.2d 292 (1976).
104. 45 N.C. App. 655, 263 S.E.2d 853 (1980).
105. Id. at 660, 263 S.E.2d at 856.
106. 53 N.C. App. 46, 279 S.E.2d 876 (1981).

107. 49 N.C. App. 533, 272 S.E.2d 8 (1980).
108. Id. at 535, 272 S.E.2d at 10.
109. Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973) (internship, residency, and subsequent practice); Simons v. Georgiade, 55 N.C. App. 483, 286 S.E.2d 596 (residency, training,
and subsequent practice), cert. denied, 305 N.C. 587, 292 S.E.2d 571 (1982).
110. Hart v. Warren, 46 N.C. App. 672, 266 S.E.2d 53, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 89 (1980).
111. 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d 196 (1974).
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personal consultations, journals, and periodicals was held competent to testify
concerning it.
C. Same or Similar Communizy Rule
Since adoption of the same or similar community rule in 1970 and its
subsequent codification in 1976, efforts to exclude expert testimony seeking to
establish malpractice, on grounds of the witness' lack of familiarity with customary practice in the same or similar community, have become almost routine and the issue now has been litigated in a number of cases. Despite these
developments, the courts have not attempted to define or establish general
guidelines for determining what constitutes similar communities. A general
statement in Williams v. Reynolds"12 identified the nature of the treatment involved, the character of the community concerned, and the comparability of
medical facilities available as relevant considerations.' 1 3 Geographical proximity of the communities apparently is not necessary,' 14 and no requirement
that the practitioner was trained or had practiced in North Carolina seems to
5
exist.1
The circumstance most emphasized in the cases is the nature of the treatment involved. This consideration was initially relied on in Wiggins v.
Piver,n 6 the first case to adopt the same or similar community standard, in
which the court said:
The operative procedures here involved would seem to be as
simple and uncomplicated as any cutting operation one may imagine. Reason does not appear to the non-medically oriented mind
why there should be any essential differences in the manner of closing an incision, whether performed in Jacksonville, Kinston, Goldsboro, Sanford, Lexington, Reidsville, Elkin,
Mt. Airy, or any other
17
similar community in North Carolina."
Courts have relied on similar reasoning in subsequent cases to find experts
qualified to testify about customary practice." 8 These cases imply that when
treatment is uncomplicated or involves procedures that are generally followed
in the profession, other differences between the communities involved may not
be important. In many of these cases, however, the identity of the communi112. 45 N.C. App. 655, 263 S.E.2d 853 (1980).
113. Id. at 658, 263 S.E.2d at 855.
114. Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973) (Mt. Airy, N.C. compared to
Youngstown, Ohio and Los Angeles, Ca.); Simons v. Georgiade, 55 N.C. App. 483, 286 S.E.2d 596
(Durham, N.C. compared to Winston-Salem, N.C. and Charlottesville, Va.), cert. denied,305 N.C.
587, 292 S.E.2d 571 (1982); Williams v. Reynolds, 45 N.C. App. 655, 263 S.E.2d 853 (1980) (Wake
County, N.C. compared to Evansville, Ind. and Chicago, IM.).
115. See cases cited supra note 114.
116. 276 N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970).
117. Id. at 138, 171 S.E.2d at 395-96.
118. See Rucker v. High Point Memorial Hosp., 285 N.C. 519,206 S.E.2d 196 (1974); Howard
v. Piver, 53 N.C. App. 46, 279 S.E.2d 876 (1981); Page v. Wilson Memorial Hosp., 49 N.C. App.
533, 272 S.E.2d 8 (1980); Williams v. Reynolds, 45 N.C. App. 655, 263 S.E.2d 853 (1980).
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ties coupled with general knowledge about them, without additional proof,
may well have justified a conclusion that they were similar.
In Rucker v. High Point MemorialHospital,1 9 in which no basis existed
for finding similarity in the communities, the reason for finding the expert's
testimony admissible was that "gunshot wounds of the lower leg lend themselves most readily to uniform medical and surgical treatment without regard
to locality."' 20 There is evidence in the decision that the court was not yet
ready to state a generally applicable rule on this issue. The court observed
that the case involved a "duly accreditedhospital" rather than a "local country
doctor" and that "[n]ot all injuries [are] so uniform and the treatment so generally well known and followed."'121 Language in a later court of appeals case,
Thompson v. Lockert, 122 suggests that the Rucker rule may be limited to duly
accredited hospitals; neither the issue nor the facts involved, however, paralleled those inRucker. In Thompson there was no evidence that uniform medical procedures applied to the treatment involved,123 and the court held only
that the reasoning in Rucker did not support adoption of a national standard
for diplomates of the American Board of Orthopedic Surgeons.
The court has not yet expressly considered other factors, such as those
identified in the Williams case, that may be relevant to determining whether
communities are similar. When obvious similarity of communities exists, the
court apparently has not insisted upon specific proof that the communities are
comparable in size, available medical facilities, or other characteristics. In a
suit against Wilson County Hospital, a witness familiar with practice in several other eastern North Carolina county hospitals was permitted to testify,
despite defendant's objection that no proof existed to show that the communities were similar. 124 Similarity of medical practice at three university medical
centers located in Winston Salem, Charlottesville, and Durham was found
when only minimal proof apparently had been offered to show that the communities were similar. 12 Common knowledge, without special proof, makes
apparent numerous elements that show the communities involved in these two
cases were similar.
A reasonable argument can be made that detailed proof that communities
within North Carolina are similar should be required only in exceptional
cases.' 26 Undoubtedly, there are other situations, less capable of general char119. 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d 196 (1974).
120. Id. at 527, 206 S.E.2d at 201.
121. Id.
122. 34 N.C. App. 1, 237 S.E.2d 259, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 593, 239 S.E.2d 264 (1977).
123. Another case that is factually distinguishable is Bullard v. North Carolina Nat'1 Bank, 31
N.C. App. 312, 229 S.E.2d 245 (1976), in which the court dispensed with the unusual argument
that Rucker prohibits testimony by experts familiar with practice in similar communities and requires familiarity with national standards.
124. Page v. Wilson Memorial Hosp., 49 N.C. App. 533, 272 S.E.2d 8 (1980).
125. Simons v. Georgiade, 55 N.C. App. 483, 286 S.E.2d 596, cert. denied, 305 N.C. 587, 291
S.E.2d 571 (1982).
126. In Dailey v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 60 N.C. App. 441, 443, 299
S.E.2d 473, 475, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 386, 302 S.E.2d 249 (1983), involving disciplinary proceedings against a New Bern dentist for rendering negligent treatment, the court held that findings and
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acterization, for which a similar view would be equally reasonable. A requirement of detailed proof in such cases may simply add to the time and expense
of litigation, constitute a technical obstacle to admission of relevant evidence,
and promote an artifically narrow view of medical practice.
In other situations, serious question may exist about the similarity of the
communities and proof of this fact will be required. Thus, when there was no
evidence to establish the similarity of the communities involved, the testimony
127
of a Chicago dentist offered to establish dental malpractice in New Bern
and that of a New York neurosurgeon offered to show negligent surgery in a
hospital in Rowan County have been held inadmissible. 128 The difficult question in these situations is what proof should be offered to show that the communities are similar. The only possible answer to this question, although it
may appear simplistic, is to offer evidence to establish as many common or
similar characteristics of the communities, such as size, medical facilities, type
of community, and quality of medical practice, as possible. When the treatment is uncomplicated or involves uniform or generally accepted procedures,
evidence of this fact should certainly be offered. The witness' own opinion of
the similarity of the communities also should be solicited.
A great deal of discretion necessarily will be involved in determining
whether communities are similar. The importance of any characteristic may
depend on the facts of a particular case or on the presence or absence of other
similarities. No rule of thumb exists to determine what differences in size,
population, or medical facilities may be present while still permitting the communities to be regarded as similar. Even the relationship between customary
practice in a particular community and the factors commonly relied on to
show the similarity of communities is a tenuous one at best.
A number of states that have adopted the same or similar community rule
apply a general or national standard to specialists.' 29 Although the court of
appeals in one case found the reasons for this distinction "appealing and persuasive," it rejected the idea as inconsistent with North Carolina case law and
statutes.' 30 Its assessment is accurate on both points.
V. INFORMED CONSENT
Medical treatment performed without a patient's consent, such as an unauthorized operation, may constitute a battery.' 3' Difficult problems arise
conclusions of law couched in terms of a "standard of practice observed in North Carolina" were
erroneous. Because this case involved application of an improper standard of care, it does not

seem inconsistent with the statement made in the text.
127. Dailey v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 60 N.C. App. 441, 299 S.E.2d
473, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 386, 302 S.E.2d 249 (1983).
128. Thompson, 34 N.C. App. 1, 237 S.E.2d 259.
129. Cases applying the national standard to specialists are collected at Annot., 18 A.L.R.4th
603, 614-16 (1982).
130. Thompson, 34 N.C. App. at 4, 237 S.E.2d at 261.
131. Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510,73 S.E.2d 320 (1952); Nelson v. Patrick, 58 N.C. App. 546,
293 S.E.2d 829 (1982).
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when interpreting the scope of a patient's consent to determine if treatment is
authorized. The older cases tended to interpret the scope of consent narrowly
so that any different operation or extension of one for which consent had been
given was held to be a battery.1 32 Recent cases tend to give a broader interpretation to the scope of a patient's consent. In Kennedy v. Parrott133 defendant surgeon diagnosed plaintiff's ailment as appendicitis and recommended an
operation to which plaintiff consented. During the operation defendant discovered enlarged cysts on plaintiffs ovary and punctured them. Although this
act was done skillfully, severe complications resulted. The court, in rejecting
plaintiff's battery claim, said:
In major internal operations, both the patient and the surgeon
know the exact condition of the patient cannot be finally and definitely diagnosed until after the patient is completely anesthesized
and the incision has been made. In such a case the consent-in the
absence of proof to the contrary-will be construed as general in nature and the surgeon may extend the operation to remedy any abnormal or diseased condition in the area of the original incision
whenever he, in the exercise of his sound professional judgment, determines that correct surgical procedure dictates and requires such an
extension of the operation originally contemplated. This rule applies
when the patient is at the time incapable of giving consent, and no
one with authority to consent for the patient is immediately
available. 134
A related but distinguishable problem arises when a patient consents to
the operation performed but has not been properly advised of the risks of, and
options to, the operation so that his consent is not an informed one. Today, a
majority of jurisdictions hold that no battery exists under these circumstances
and that the patient's cause of action, if any, must be in negligence. 135 Although most North Carolina informed consent cases have been tried on a negligence theory, a failure to distinguish the two situations sometimes occurs.
For example, in Brigham v. Hicks13 6 the court, in considering an informed
consent claim, said: "The courts in this state had recognized that there may be
an action for assault if a physician performs a surgical procedure on a person
without properly informing that person of the risks involved so that an in137
formed consent may be given."
The distinction between battery and informed consent cases is recognized
13 8
and clearly stated in a recent court of appeals decision:
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
In

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS § 18, at 104-05 (4th ed. 1971).
243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
Id. at 362-63, 90 S.E.2d at 759.
W. PROSSER, supra note 132, § 32, at 165.
44 N.C. App. 152, 260 S.E.2d 435 (1979).
Id. at 156, 260 S.E.2d at 437.
Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975), in which a patient claimed her

consent to an operation had been induced by the doctor's representation that the operation was
simple and involved no danger, the court, although it found no cause of action, gave extensive
consideration to the battery theory alleged by the plaintiff.
138. Nelson v. Patrick, 58 N.C. App. 546, 293 S.E.2d 829 (1982).
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Where a medical procedure is completely unauthorized, it constitutes an assault and battery ....

If, however, the procedure is

authorized, but the patient claims a failure to disclose139
the risks involved, the cause of action is bottomed on negligence.
North Carolina cases suggest that a battery action can be maintained when the
patient's consent is obtained by the doctor's fraudulent misrepresentations
about the treatment or operation.' 40 This result can be justified on the
grounds that, under these circumstances, the issue of the reasonableness of the
doctor's disclosure does not arise.
Courts are substantially divided on the question whether a reasonable
care or customary practice standard should be applied in informed consent
cases. A brief description of the two views may be helpful. Jurisdictions 14 1
adopting the reasonable care standard require disclosure of all risks that
would be important to a reasonable person when deciding whether to consent
to medical treatment. They recognize that expert evidence usually will be required to identify the risks involved in medical treatment, the alternatives to
the treatment, and the risk associated with such alternatives; once these facts
have been established, however, the courts consider the judgment about the
reasonableness of the doctor's disclosure to be within the jury's competence.
Initially, at least, doubts existed concerning the presence of any generally accepted medical practice in the profession relating to disclosure. Exercise of
discretion by the doctor in determining disclosures to be made is recognized,
but the burden to justify limited disclosure for this reason is placed on the
doctor.142

Jurisdictions 143 following the customary practice standard regard the disclosure issue to be an amalgam of risks, alternatives, discretion, and judgment
in which these factors are interrelated and, therefore, not pradtically separable
into distinct departments. Assessing and balancing these factors requires professional skill and knowledge, and the judgment regarding the extent of disclosure is a professional one. For these reasons, the determination of negligence
in informed consent cases as well as in treatment cases must be based upon the
customary practice standard.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized the informed
consent doctrine in 1964,144 no clear choice between the reasonable care and
customary practice standards had been made by the court when a legislative
139. Id. at 550, 293 S.E.2d at 832.
140. See Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 524, 88 S.E.2d 762, 767 (1955) (Bobbitt, J., concurring); Brigham v. Hicks, 44 N.C. App. 152, 260 S.E.2d 435 (1979).
141. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Miller v. Kennedy, I1 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), a'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530

P.2d 334 (1975).

142. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
Miller v. Kennedy, I1 Wash. App. 272, ., 522 P.2d 852, 863-64 (1974).
143. See, e.g., Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (rex. 1967); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222

S.E.2d 783 (1976).
144. Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964).
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standard was adopted in 1976.145 In McPherson v. Ellis,14 6 a case decided in
1982 to which the new statute was inapplicable, the court addressed the issue
but left it open:
A major issue in informed consent cases is whether a plaintiff
must present expert medical testimony to establish the existence and
scope of a physician's duty to disclose risks of a proposed treatment
.... The Court of Appeals apparently proceeded under the theory
that such testimony is not required. .

.

. The determination of this

issue is not essential to the resolution of this case; therefore we express no opinion.... 147
The statutory standard of care for informed consent cases is set out in
North Carolina General Statute section 90-21.13:
(a) No recovery shall be allowed against any health care provider upon the grounds that the health care treatment was rendered
without the informed consent of the patient.

. .

where:

(1) The action of the health care provider in obtaining the consent of the patient. . . was in accordance with the standards of practice among members of the same health care profession with similar
training and experience situated in the same or similar communities;
and
(2) A reasonable person, from the information provided by the
health care provider under the circumstances, would have a general
understanding of the procedures or treatments and of the usual and
most frequent risks and hazards inherent in the proposed procedures
or treatments which are recognized and followed by other health care
providers engaged in the same field of practice in the same or similar
communities ....148
145. Court of appeals decisions on the question are in conflict. See Nelson v. Patrick, 58 N.C.
App. 546, 293 S.E.2d 829 (1982) (statute adopting customary practice standard codified preexisting

law); McPherson v. Ellis, 53 N.C. App. 476, 281 S.E.2d 94 (1981), rev'd, 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d
892 (1982) (reasonable care standard); Brigham v. Hicks, 44 N.C. App. 152, 260 S.E.2d 435 (1979)
(unnecessary to decide); Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975) (dictum
expressing preference for customary practice standard).
146. 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d 892 (1982).
Although earlier supreme court cases contain general discussions that appear consistent with
the reasonable care standard, they are inconclusive. Three cases involved the sufficiency of plaintiffs evidence for submission to the jury; no indication exists that evidence of customary practice
was presented in any of the cases. The court in Koury v. Folo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548
(1968), found the evidence sufficient, but the holding is extremely narrow and, despite the absence
of expert testimony, might have been reached even under the customary practice standard.
The other two cases found the evidence insufficient but neither decision appears to be based
on the absence of proof of customary practice. The court in Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 159,
136 S.E.2d 617, 620-21 (1964), held that plaintiffs cause of action was defeated by her admission
that she was advised that "she would have to remain in the hospital approximately a week prior to
surgery as this was a serious operation" and that the operation was not without risk. The court in
Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 393, 158 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1968), in finding the evidence insufficient, noted that the risk involved was commonly known, the likelihood of its occurrence was
slight, and the need existed to vest discretion in the doctor to avoid creating patient anxiety. The
court also noted that "the defendant [physician] gave the plaintiff the customary warning that any
surgical procedure is accompanied by some risk of unfortunate consequences." Id.
147. McPherson, 305 N.C. at 270, 287 S.E.2d at 895.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (1981).
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Although it generally is assumed that this legislation adopted the customary
practice standard for North Carolina, 49 an examination of the statutory language reveals that the standard is more complex. Two distinct requirements
are set out inthe statute and the construction of the statute clearly indicates
that both must be met before the limitation on the health care provider's liability contained in it applies. The first requirement is that the health care provider's action in obtaining consent be in accordance with customary
practice. 150 This provision, if it stood alone, would effect an adoption of the
customary practice standard. A second and additional requirement, however,
must be met for the limitation on liability to apply. The information provided
by the health care provider must permit a reasonable person to "have a general understanding of the procedures or treatments and of the usual and most
frequent risks and hazards inherent in the proposed procedures or
151
treatments."
The statute does not provide that the defendant can escape liability either
by complying with customary practice or by providing information that will
enable a reasonable person to understand the treatment and risks. Instead, it
imposes a minimum level of disclosure that must always be made and, when it
is not, the fact that less disclosure is consistent with prevailing customary practice will not prevent imposition of liability. If the information customarily
provided in the profession meets or exceeds the minimum disclosure fixed by
the statute, liability cannot be imposed. On the other hand, if disclosures customarily made fall below the level required by the statute,a basis for liability
exists.
Under this interpretation, the plaintiff in an informed consent case may
establish the health care provider's negligence in either of two ways. First, he
may show that the information provided did not comply with-customary practice relating to disclosure. This approach usually will require testimony of
experts who are familiar with the relevant customary practice standard. Second, he may show that the disclosures made did not meet the minimum standard of disclosure required by the statute. Expert testimony to show that
defendant's conduct deviated from customary practice would not be necessary
under this approach. Because the minimum disclosure required by the statute
is tied to risks and hazards "recognized and followed by other health care
providers engaged in the same field of practice in the same or similar communities,"' 152 expert evidence to identify these risks would likely be required.
Presumably, however, as the latter testimony involves facts rather than judgment and is not a direct condemnation of a colleague, less difficulty will be
encountered in finding experts who are willing to appear.
The definition of customary practice in relation to the duty of disclosure
is the same as that which applies to orthodox medical treatment. The relevant
149.
150.
151.
152.

E.g., Nelson v. Patrick, 58 N.C. App. 546, 293 S.E.2d 829 (1982).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a)(1) (1981).
Id. § 90-21.13(a)(2).
Id.
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standard of practice is limited to defendant's area of medicine in the same or
similar communities. Earlier discussion of these constituent elements of the
customary practice standard apply here as well.
Interpretation of the minimum standard of disclosure provisions may
prove difficult. What is meant by the phrase "usual and most frequent risks
and hazards" of treatment and procedures? As the statute limits disclosure to
those that are recognized by practitioners in the same medical field in the same
or similar communities, it apparently assumes that the phrase has some generally accepted meaning in the profession. The validity of this assumption is
subject to doubt.
Because of the conservative stance of the court in handling informed consent claims under the common law, the statute may enhance the possibility for
recovery in these cases. The relative lack of success of informed consent
claims 153 and the fact that they could be decided without determining whether
customary practice or reasonable care was the standard to be applied to them
reflect the court's conservatism. Great importance was attached to the doctor's
discretion not to make disclosures that might produce anxiety in the patient
and adversely affect the patient or the success of the treatment, and, in this
context, very limited disclosures were held adequate as a matter of law. 154 For
example, in Watson v. C/utts 155 disclosure was held adequate when the patient
was informed that a thyroidectomy was a serious operation, but was not informed of specific risks involved, including the possibility of complete loss of
speech, or of available alternative methods of treatment. The court stated that
any conflict between the duty of informing the patient and the possibility of
frightening him should be resolved in favor of the primary duty to do what is
15 6
best for the patient.
The continued authority of these cases under the statute is doubtful. Although discretion undoubtedly will be a consideration in determining the extent of disclosure customarily made in practice, both its presence and
significance in a case will depend upon expert evidence. It should no longer
be a generalized element for the court to weigh as it sees fit. To consider
discretion as a limitation upon the duty to inform under the minimum disclosure standard seems inconsistent with both the language and purpose of the
statute. Under this standard legitimate exercise of discretion in withholding
information probably should be considered a defense that the doctor may
prove to justify his failure to make the minimum disclosures required.
The test of actual causation in informed consent cases also is changed by
153. In eleven cases reviewed, plaintiff's evidence was held sufficient in only three, two of
which were probably orthodox treatment cases rather than informed consent cases. In the other

eight cases, plaintifi's proof of negligence or causation was held insufficient in six and the cause of
action failed at the pretrial stage in two. No case affirming an award of damages could be found.
154. Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968); Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517,
88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
155. 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964).
156. Id. at 159, 136 S.E.2d at 621.
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the statute.157 If consent to treatment would have been given, had adequate
disclosure been made, no cause of action for negligent failure to inform is
recognized. Conflict generally exists concerning whether this determination
should be based on what the particular patient would have decided or on the
decision a reasonable person would have made under the circumstances.15 8 In
a case 159 arising before the effective date of the statute, the North Carolina
Supreme Court adopted the subjective standard, observing that an individual's
"right to decide for himself what is to be done with his body [should not be]
made subject to a standard set by others."' 160 The statute, however, adopts the
objective standard and denies recovery if "a reasonable person, under all the
surrounding circumstances, would have undergone such treatment" had
proper disclosure been made.161 Even under the objective standard, no right
162
of recovery exists when the plaintiff would have consented to the treatment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The North Carolina General Assembly's apparent purpose in codifying
the same or similar community standard for health care providers was to foreclose judicial adoption of a regional or national standard. 163 The potential for
serious consequences beyond this purpose arises both from ambiguities in its
wording and from cases that seem to interpret it to require expert testimony of
customary practice in every case before malpractice liability can be established. A literal or narrow interpretation of the statute could undermine the
objective standard in malpractice cases. The objective standard is a basic principle of all negligence law, which traditionally has been applied to hold the
health care provider to the level of skill, training, and learning possessed by
other practitioners in his field. Such an interpretation would diminish the role
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a)(3) (1981).
158. The choice between the objective and subjective tests is not easy. The objective test may
preclude consideration of the plaintiffs "fears, apprehensions, religious beliefs, or superstitions."
McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 273, 287 S.E.2d 892, 897 (1982). Under the subjective test,
whether plaintiffs testimony after the injury, even if given in good faith, actually reflects what his
decision would have been prior to undergoing treatment is questionable.
159. McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d 892 (1982).
160. Id. at 273, 287 S.E.2d at 897.
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a)(3) (1981).
162. Tripp v. Pate, 49 N.C. App. 329, 271 S.E.2d 407 (1980).
163. In Wall v. Stout, -N.C.
,311 S.E.2d 571 (1984), decided after this Article was written,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the legislature's purpose in enacting the malpractice
statute was not to "eliminate the previously existing common law" but "merely to conform the
statute . . . to existing case law applying a 'same or similar community standard."' Id. at _,
311 S.E.2d at 576. In finding inappropriate a jury instruction that enumerated three separate
elements plaintiff must prove to establish malpractice, each of which essentially encompassed
breach of customary practice, the court, in a footnote, seems to equate the statutory standard to
the professional's skill, knowledge, training, and experience and to view the issue of reasonable
care in application of these qualifications as unrelated to the statutory standard. Id, at - 311
S.E.2d at 580 n.2. This view, although acceptable in cases in which the issues are within the jury's
competence, creates serious problems in cases in which the jury needs the assistance of expert
testimony. Because the court's purpose was to indicate that proof of either lack of qualifications,
reasonable care, or good judgment sufficed to establish malpractice and that it would be improper
to require a finding of all three, the limitation on the statute suggested by the court's language may
have been inadvertent.
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of malpractice litigation in achieving competent medical services for the public, deprive some incompetently treated victims of all recovery, and increase
the burden of establishing malpractice claims for others. Concern about these
effects is heightened because the statutory standard is made applicable to essentially all persons connected with the provision of health care services.
This Article has examined the purpose of the statute in its overall context
to show that such an interpretation is neither desirable nor reasonable. The
statute cannot be divorced from the common law it codifies and viewed as an
exclusive statement of malpractice liability law. Even the concepts of customary practice and same or similar community are meaningful only in terms of
their common-law development. Unless thoughtful and careful consideration
is given to the statute in this broader context, fundamental and undesirable
changes in malpractice liability law may result from isolated cases that focus
narrowly upon particular language of the statute.
Sensible application of the "same or similar community" standard also
challenges the courts. Except in extreme cases, little difference in the quality
of medical services between communities may exist in an era in which substantially equal education, training, opportunity, and medical facilities are
available to practitioners. Under these circumstances, undue emphasis on geography, size, and similar factors, rather than ensuring fairness to the practitioner, may erect unfair barriers to the victim's recovery.

